MiR robot controllers (central computation unit) makes use of Ubuntu 16.04.2 an operating system, Thought for desktop uses, this operating system presents insecure defaults for robots. These insecurities include a way for users to escalate their access beyond what they were granted via file creation, access race conditions, insecure home directory configurations and defaults that facilitate Denial of Service (DoS) attacks.
MiR100, MiR200 and other MiR robots use the Robot Operating System (ROS) default packages exposing the computational graph without any sort of authentication. This allows attackers with access to the internal wireless and wired networks to take control of the robot seamlessly. In combination with CVE-2020-10269 and CVE-2020-10271, this flaw allows malicious actors to command the robot at desire.
MiR100, MiR200 and other MiR robots use the Robot Operating System (ROS) default packages exposing the computational graph to all network interfaces, wireless and wired. This is the result of a bad set up and can be mitigated by appropriately configuring ROS and/or applying custom patches as appropriate. Currently, the ROS computational graph can be accessed fully from the wired exposed ports. In combination with other flaws such as CVE-2020-10269, the computation graph can also be fetched and interacted from wireless networks. This allows a malicious operator to take control of the ROS logic and correspondingly, the complete robot given that MiR's operations are centered around the framework (ROS).
Out of the wired and wireless interfaces within MiR100, MiR200 and other vehicles from the MiR fleet, it's possible to access the Control Dashboard on a hardcoded IP address. Credentials to such wireless interface default to well known and widely spread users (omitted) and passwords (omitted). This information is also available in past User Guides and manuals which the vendor distributed. This flaw allows cyber attackers to take control of the robot remotely and make use of the default user interfaces MiR has created, lowering the complexity of attacks and making them available to entry-level attackers. More elaborated attacks can also be established by clearing authentication and sending network requests directly. We have confirmed this flaw in MiR100 and MiR200 but according to the vendor, it might also apply to MiR250, MiR500 and MiR1000.
One of the wireless interfaces within MiR100, MiR200 and possibly (according to the vendor) other MiR fleet vehicles comes pre-configured in WiFi Master (Access Point) mode. Credentials to such wireless Access Point default to well known and widely spread SSID (MiR_RXXXX) and passwords (omitted). This information is also available in past User Guides and manuals which the vendor distributed. We have confirmed this flaw in MiR100 and MiR200 but it might also apply to MiR250, MiR500 and MiR1000.
MiR controllers across firmware versions 220.127.116.11 and before do not encrypt or protect in any way the intellectual property artifacts installed in the robots. This flaw allows attackers with access to the robot or the robot network (while in combination with other flaws) to retrieve and easily exfiltrate all installed intellectual property and data.